Hopiu/angular.js
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/Hopiu/angular.js.git synced 2026-03-16 23:30:23 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

fix($compile): allow data: image URIs in img[src]

Browse source 
Ref: 1adf29af13

BREAKING CHANGE: img[src] URLs are now sanitized via a separate
    whitelist regex instead of sharing the whitelist regex with a[href].
    With this change, img[src] URLs may also be data: URI's matching
    mime types image/*.  mailto: URLs are disallowed (and do not make
    sense for img[src] but were allowed under the a[href] whitelist used
    before.)
This commit is contained in:
Chirayu Krishnappa 2013-07-16 12:48:29 -07:00
parent e449c6df06
commit 3e39ac7e1b
2 changed files with 77 additions and 28 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

59
src/ng/compile.js
View file

@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ function $CompileProvider($provide) {
Suffix = 'Directive',
COMMENT_DIRECTIVE_REGEXP = /^\s*directive\:\s*([\d\w\-_]+)\s+(.*)$/,
CLASS_DIRECTIVE_REGEXP = /(([\d\w\-_]+)(?:\:([^;]+))?;?)/,
urlSanitizationWhitelist = /^\s*(https?|ftp|mailto|file):/;
aHrefSanitizationWhitelist = /^\s*(https?|ftp|mailto|file):/,
imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist = /^\s*(https?|ftp|file):|data:image\//;
// Ref: http://developers.whatwg.org/webappapis.html#event-handler-idl-attributes
// The assumption is that future DOM event attribute names will begin with
@ -213,32 +214,61 @@ function $CompileProvider($provide) {
/**
* @ngdoc function
* @name ng.$compileProvider#urlSanitizationWhitelist
* @name ng.$compileProvider#aHrefSanitizationWhitelist
* @methodOf ng.$compileProvider
* @function
*
* @description
* Retrieves or overrides the default regular expression that is used for whitelisting of safe
* urls during a[href] and img[src] sanitization.
* urls during a[href] sanitization.
*
* The sanitization is a security measure aimed at prevent XSS attacks via html links.
*
* Any url about to be assigned to a[href] or img[src] via data-binding is first normalized and
* turned into an absolute url. Afterwards, the url is matched against the
* `urlSanitizationWhitelist` regular expression. If a match is found, the original url is written
* into the dom. Otherwise, the absolute url is prefixed with `'unsafe:'` string and only then is
* it written into the DOM.
* Any url about to be assigned to a[href] via data-binding is first normalized and turned into
* an absolute url. Afterwards, the url is matched against the `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist`
* regular expression. If a match is found, the original url is written into the dom. Otherwise,
* the absolute url is prefixed with `'unsafe:'` string and only then is it written into the DOM.
*
* @param {RegExp=} regexp New regexp to whitelist urls with.
* @returns {RegExp|ng.$compileProvider} Current RegExp if called without value or self for
* chaining otherwise.
*/
this.urlSanitizationWhitelist = function(regexp) {
this.aHrefSanitizationWhitelist = function(regexp) {
if (isDefined(regexp)) {
urlSanitizationWhitelist = regexp;
aHrefSanitizationWhitelist = regexp;
return this;
}
return urlSanitizationWhitelist;
return aHrefSanitizationWhitelist;
};
/**
* @ngdoc function
* @name ng.$compileProvider#imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist
* @methodOf ng.$compileProvider
* @function
*
* @description
* Retrieves or overrides the default regular expression that is used for whitelisting of safe
* urls during img[src] sanitization.
*
* The sanitization is a security measure aimed at prevent XSS attacks via html links.
*
* Any url about to be assigned to img[src] via data-binding is first normalized and turned into an
* absolute url. Afterwards, the url is matched against the `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` regular
* expression. If a match is found, the original url is written into the dom. Otherwise, the
* absolute url is prefixed with `'unsafe:'` string and only then is it written into the DOM.
*
* @param {RegExp=} regexp New regexp to whitelist urls with.
* @returns {RegExp|ng.$compileProvider} Current RegExp if called without value or self for
* chaining otherwise.
*/
this.imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist = function(regexp) {
if (isDefined(regexp)) {
imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist = regexp;
return this;
}
return imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist;
};
@ -298,8 +328,11 @@ function $CompileProvider($provide) {
// href property always returns normalized absolute url, so we can match against that
normalizedVal = urlSanitizationNode.href;
if (normalizedVal !== '' && !normalizedVal.match(urlSanitizationWhitelist)) {
this[key] = value = 'unsafe:' + normalizedVal;
if (normalizedVal !== '') {
if ((key === 'href' && !normalizedVal.match(aHrefSanitizationWhitelist)) ||
(key === 'src' && !normalizedVal.match(imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist))) {
this[key] = value = 'unsafe:' + normalizedVal;
}
}
}

46
test/ng/compileSpec.js
View file

@ -2551,15 +2551,38 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('unsafe:javascript:doEvilStuff()');
}));
it('should sanitize data: urls', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
it('should sanitize non-image data: urls', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
element = $compile('<img src="{{testUrl}}"></a>')($rootScope);
$rootScope.testUrl = "data:evilPayload";
$rootScope.testUrl = "data:application/javascript;charset=US-ASCII,alert('evil!');";
$rootScope.$apply();
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('unsafe:data:evilPayload');
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe("unsafe:data:application/javascript;charset=US-ASCII,alert('evil!');");
$rootScope.testUrl = "data:,foo";
$rootScope.$apply();
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe("unsafe:data:,foo");
}));
it('should not sanitize data: URIs for images', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
element = $compile('<img src="{{dataUri}}"></img>')($rootScope);
// image data uri
// ref: http://probablyprogramming.com/2009/03/15/the-tiniest-gif-ever
$rootScope.dataUri = "";
$rootScope.$apply();
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('');
}));
// Fails on IE < 10 with "TypeError: Access is denied" when trying to set img[src]
if (!msie || msie > 10) {
it('should sanitize mailto: urls', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
element = $compile('<img src="{{testUrl}}"></a>')($rootScope);
$rootScope.testUrl = "mailto:foo@bar.com";
$rootScope.$apply();
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('unsafe:mailto:foo@bar.com');
}));
}
it('should sanitize obfuscated javascript: urls', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
element = $compile('<img src="{{testUrl}}"></img>')($rootScope);
@ -2636,13 +2659,6 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
$rootScope.$apply();
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('ftp://foo.com/bar');
// Fails on IE < 10 with "TypeError: Access is denied" when trying to set img[src]
if (!msie || msie > 10) {
$rootScope.testUrl = "mailto:foo@bar.com";
$rootScope.$apply();
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('mailto:foo@bar.com');
}
$rootScope.testUrl = "file:///foo/bar.html";
$rootScope.$apply();
expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('file:///foo/bar.html');
@ -2660,8 +2676,8 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
it('should allow reconfiguration of the src whitelist', function() {
module(function($compileProvider) {
expect($compileProvider.urlSanitizationWhitelist() instanceof RegExp).toBe(true);
var returnVal = $compileProvider.urlSanitizationWhitelist(/javascript:/);
expect($compileProvider.imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist() instanceof RegExp).toBe(true);
var returnVal = $compileProvider.imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist(/javascript:/);
expect(returnVal).toBe($compileProvider);
});
@ -2812,8 +2828,8 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
it('should allow reconfiguration of the href whitelist', function() {
module(function($compileProvider) {
expect($compileProvider.urlSanitizationWhitelist() instanceof RegExp).toBe(true);
var returnVal = $compileProvider.urlSanitizationWhitelist(/javascript:/);
expect($compileProvider.aHrefSanitizationWhitelist() instanceof RegExp).toBe(true);
var returnVal = $compileProvider.aHrefSanitizationWhitelist(/javascript:/);
expect(returnVal).toBe($compileProvider);
});