fix($compile): allow data: image URIs in img[src]

Ref: 1adf29af13

BREAKING CHANGE: img[src] URLs are now sanitized via a separate
    whitelist regex instead of sharing the whitelist regex with a[href].
    With this change, img[src] URLs may also be data: URI's matching
    mime types image/*.  mailto: URLs are disallowed (and do not make
    sense for img[src] but were allowed under the a[href] whitelist used
    before.)

src/ng/compile.js

@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ function $CompileProvider($provide) {
       Suffix = 'Directive',
       COMMENT_DIRECTIVE_REGEXP = /^\s*directive\:\s*([\d\w\-_]+)\s+(.*)$/,
       CLASS_DIRECTIVE_REGEXP = /(([\d\w\-_]+)(?:\:([^;]+))?;?)/,
-      urlSanitizationWhitelist = /^\s*(https?|ftp|mailto|file):/;
+      aHrefSanitizationWhitelist = /^\s*(https?|ftp|mailto|file):/,
+      imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist = /^\s*(https?|ftp|file):|data:image\//;
 
   // Ref: http://developers.whatwg.org/webappapis.html#event-handler-idl-attributes
   // The assumption is that future DOM event attribute names will begin with
@@ -213,32 +214,61 @@ function $CompileProvider($provide) {
 
   /**
    * @ngdoc function
-   * @name ng.$compileProvider#urlSanitizationWhitelist
+   * @name ng.$compileProvider#aHrefSanitizationWhitelist
    * @methodOf ng.$compileProvider
    * @function
    *
    * @description
    * Retrieves or overrides the default regular expression that is used for whitelisting of safe
-   * urls during a[href] and img[src] sanitization.
+   * urls during a[href] sanitization.
    *
    * The sanitization is a security measure aimed at prevent XSS attacks via html links.
    *
-   * Any url about to be assigned to a[href] or img[src] via data-binding is first normalized and
+   * Any url about to be assigned to a[href] via data-binding is first normalized and turned into
-   * turned into an absolute url. Afterwards, the url is matched against the
+   * an absolute url. Afterwards, the url is matched against the `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist`
-   * `urlSanitizationWhitelist` regular expression. If a match is found, the original url is written
+   * regular expression. If a match is found, the original url is written into the dom. Otherwise,
-   * into the dom. Otherwise, the absolute url is prefixed with `'unsafe:'` string and only then is
+   * the absolute url is prefixed with `'unsafe:'` string and only then is it written into the DOM.
-   * it written into the DOM.
    *
    * @param {RegExp=} regexp New regexp to whitelist urls with.
    * @returns {RegExp|ng.$compileProvider} Current RegExp if called without value or self for
    *    chaining otherwise.
    */
-  this.urlSanitizationWhitelist = function(regexp) {
+  this.aHrefSanitizationWhitelist = function(regexp) {
     if (isDefined(regexp)) {
-      urlSanitizationWhitelist = regexp;
+      aHrefSanitizationWhitelist = regexp;
       return this;
     }
-    return urlSanitizationWhitelist;
+    return aHrefSanitizationWhitelist;
+  };
+
+
+  /**
+   * @ngdoc function
+   * @name ng.$compileProvider#imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist
+   * @methodOf ng.$compileProvider
+   * @function
+   *
+   * @description
+   * Retrieves or overrides the default regular expression that is used for whitelisting of safe
+   * urls during img[src] sanitization.
+   *
+   * The sanitization is a security measure aimed at prevent XSS attacks via html links.
+   *
+   * Any url about to be assigned to img[src] via data-binding is first normalized and turned into an
+   * absolute url. Afterwards, the url is matched against the `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` regular
+   * expression. If a match is found, the original url is written into the dom. Otherwise, the
+   * absolute url is prefixed with `'unsafe:'` string and only then is it written into the DOM.
+   *
+   * @param {RegExp=} regexp New regexp to whitelist urls with.
+   * @returns {RegExp|ng.$compileProvider} Current RegExp if called without value or self for
+   *    chaining otherwise.
+   */
+  this.imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist = function(regexp) {
+    if (isDefined(regexp)) {
+      imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist = regexp;
+      return this;
+    }
+    return imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist;
   };
 
 
@@ -298,8 +328,11 @@ function $CompileProvider($provide) {
 
           // href property always returns normalized absolute url, so we can match against that
           normalizedVal = urlSanitizationNode.href;
-          if (normalizedVal !== '' && !normalizedVal.match(urlSanitizationWhitelist)) {
+          if (normalizedVal !== '') {
-            this[key] = value = 'unsafe:' + normalizedVal;
+            if ((key === 'href' && !normalizedVal.match(aHrefSanitizationWhitelist)) ||
+                (key === 'src' && !normalizedVal.match(imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist))) {
+              this[key] = value = 'unsafe:' + normalizedVal;
+            }
           }
         }
 

test/ng/compileSpec.js

@@ -2551,15 +2551,38 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
       expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('unsafe:javascript:doEvilStuff()');
     }));
 
-    it('should sanitize data: urls', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
+    it('should sanitize non-image data: urls', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
       element = $compile('<img src="{{testUrl}}"></a>')($rootScope);
-      $rootScope.testUrl = "data:evilPayload";
+      $rootScope.testUrl = "data:application/javascript;charset=US-ASCII,alert('evil!');";
       $rootScope.$apply();
-
+      expect(element.attr('src')).toBe("unsafe:data:application/javascript;charset=US-ASCII,alert('evil!');");
-      expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('unsafe:data:evilPayload');
+      $rootScope.testUrl = "data:,foo";
+      $rootScope.$apply();
+      expect(element.attr('src')).toBe("unsafe:data:,foo");
     }));
 
 
+    it('should not sanitize data: URIs for images', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
+      element = $compile('<img src="{{dataUri}}"></img>')($rootScope);
+
+      // image data uri
+      // ref: http://probablyprogramming.com/2009/03/15/the-tiniest-gif-ever
+      $rootScope.dataUri = "";
+      $rootScope.$apply();
+      expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('');
+    }));
+
+
+    // Fails on IE < 10 with "TypeError: Access is denied" when trying to set img[src]
+    if (!msie || msie > 10) {
+      it('should sanitize mailto: urls', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
+        element = $compile('<img src="{{testUrl}}"></a>')($rootScope);
+          $rootScope.testUrl = "mailto:foo@bar.com";
+          $rootScope.$apply();
+          expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('unsafe:mailto:foo@bar.com');
+      }));
+    }
+
     it('should sanitize obfuscated javascript: urls', inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
       element = $compile('<img src="{{testUrl}}"></img>')($rootScope);
 
@@ -2636,13 +2659,6 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
       $rootScope.$apply();
       expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('ftp://foo.com/bar');
 
-      // Fails on IE < 10 with "TypeError: Access is denied" when trying to set img[src]
-      if (!msie || msie > 10) {
-        $rootScope.testUrl = "mailto:foo@bar.com";
-        $rootScope.$apply();
-        expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('mailto:foo@bar.com');
-      }
-
       $rootScope.testUrl = "file:///foo/bar.html";
       $rootScope.$apply();
       expect(element.attr('src')).toBe('file:///foo/bar.html');
@@ -2660,8 +2676,8 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
 
     it('should allow reconfiguration of the src whitelist', function() {
       module(function($compileProvider) {
-        expect($compileProvider.urlSanitizationWhitelist() instanceof RegExp).toBe(true);
+        expect($compileProvider.imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist() instanceof RegExp).toBe(true);
-        var returnVal = $compileProvider.urlSanitizationWhitelist(/javascript:/);
+        var returnVal = $compileProvider.imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist(/javascript:/);
         expect(returnVal).toBe($compileProvider);
       });
 
@@ -2812,8 +2828,8 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
 
     it('should allow reconfiguration of the href whitelist', function() {
       module(function($compileProvider) {
-        expect($compileProvider.urlSanitizationWhitelist() instanceof RegExp).toBe(true);
+        expect($compileProvider.aHrefSanitizationWhitelist() instanceof RegExp).toBe(true);
-        var returnVal = $compileProvider.urlSanitizationWhitelist(/javascript:/);
+        var returnVal = $compileProvider.aHrefSanitizationWhitelist(/javascript:/);
         expect(returnVal).toBe($compileProvider);
       });